As the first illustration of a potential satisfier for the 'platitudes for truth' in the appendix to his engaging recent discussion of the concept of truth (Wright 1999), Crispin Wright has proposed a notion of 'truth conceived as coherence' for arithmetic. This paper attempts to clarify certain aspects of Wright's proposal.
(T ¬ ) ¬ϕ is true iff ϕ is not true.
(T ∧ ) ϕ ∧ ψ is true iff ϕ and ψ are both true.
(T ∨ ) ϕ ∨ ψ is true iff either ϕ or ψ is true.
(T → ) ϕ → ψ is true iff either ϕ is not true or ψ is true.
(T ∀ ) ∀xϕ is true iff, for each number n, ϕ(n) is true.
(T ∃ ) ∃xϕ is true iff, for some number n, ϕ(n) is true.
Any inductively defined set of L-sentences can be explicitly defined as the smallest set fulfilling the given conditions. For the Tarskian inductive definition (T At )-(T ∃ ), the smallest such set is the set of arithmetic truths Th(N): the set of L-sentences true in the standard structure N.
In light of Wright's definition, consider the following inductive definition.
Definition A: Let B be an r.e. theory in L. Then let a set X ⊆ Sent(L) be called a Wright set for B just in case, it satisfies the following conditions:
(ii) ¬ϕ ∈ X ⇔ ϕ ∉ X (iii) ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ X ⇔ (ϕ ∈ X and ψ ∈ X) (iv) ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ X ⇔ (ϕ ∈ X or ψ ∈ X) (v) ϕ → ψ ∈ X ⇔ (ϕ ∉ X or ψ ∈ X) (vi) ∀xϕ ∈ X ⇔ for each number n, ϕ(n) ∈ X (vii) ∃xϕ ∈ X ⇔ for some number n, ϕ(n) ∈ X.
If there exists a unique set X satisfying these conditions, it is denoted W B .
Given a coherence base B, the sets that Wright inductively defined have the form Proof: For reductio, assume such a set X exists. By (ii), it must be consistent. But there is a closed term t such that B does not prove t = n (for any n). Hence, by (i), t = n ∉ X, for all n. So, for all n, t ≠ n ∈ X. So, by (vi), ∀x(t ≠ x) ∈ X. Since X is closed under the consequence relation, we have t ≠ t ∈ X, contradicting the consistency of X.
Hence, there is no such set X. QED.
Before we prove the following results, we introduce the idea from model theory of a canonical model for =-closed set Y of atomic sentences of L (for details, see Hodges 1997, pp. 19-21) . Let Y be an =-closed set of atomic sentences of L. That is, each
We define the canonical model M for Y as follows. For any closed terms t,
given by, 
The cases for the other logical connectives are similar. Finally, let ϕ have the form ∀xψ(x) and suppose that for all t, ψ(t) ∈ X if and only if M ¸ ψ(t). Then, ϕ ∈ X if and only if, for all n, ψ(n) ∈ X, iff for
subcase where ϕ is existentially quantified is similar. QED.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is:
Corollary 3 It is well-known that the standard structure N for arithmetic is isomorphic to the canonical model for the set of true atomic sentences of arithmetic. Hence, system of arithmetic extending Q is Π 1 -complete.
In any case, because Q proves all atomic truths and refutes all atomic falsehoods, Theorem 5: Let B be any consistent extension of Q. Then W B = Th(N).
So, the set of L-sentences 'cohering' with any such base theory B is precisely the set of arithmetic truths.
The Material Adequacy of Wright's Proposal
Wright asks whether the Tarski ∈ Form(L), we have 6 ,
This is established by a meta-induction on formula complexity. Then, in the case where the L-formula ϕ has no free variables, this gives the usual Tarski T-sentences, of the form T(
We can also formalize Wright's inductive definition. Since the coherence base B is recursively axiomatized, the recursive relation "n is the code of a proof in B of formula with code m" may be represented arithmetically by a ∆ 1 -formula Proof B (y, x). 
5 This is the Tarskian theory of truth discussed, for example, in Feferman 1991 and Halbach 1996 . This theory is sometimes called PA(S). See Halbach 2000 'Truth and Reduction' for a comprehensive survey of recent work on axiomatic truth theories. 6 The sentence ∀x[T(
is the uniform Tarski disquotation sentence for ϕ(x), where x is a finite sequence of variables and (boldface) x is a defined function term with the variable x free meaning 'the code of the result of substituting the standard numeral for x'. 7 The notations '¬ ¬(x)', 'x ∧ ∧ y', …, '∀ ∀(x, v) and 'x(v/y)' below are function symbols, which are arithmetizations of the syntactic notions needed to formalize Wright's clauses. For example, '¬ ¬(x)' means 'the code of the formula whose negation has code x' and '∀ ∀(x, v)' means 'the code of the universal quantification of the formula whose code is x with respect to the variable whose code is v'.
We have seen that the co-extensiveness of the set W B and the set of arithmetic truths amounts to the assumption that the atomic sentences provable in B are precisely those which are true. Since this entails that B does not prove 0 = 1, this assumption implies the consistency of B. So, our coherence base B had better not be too strong. We should not want our meta-theoretic verification that theory of truth is materially adequate to bear the further quite unwarranted burden of proving the consistency of B if B is strong. 
By a modification of what we already know about the Tarskian truth theory Tr(PA),
we have the following result:
Theorem 6. PA(Coh B ) is materially adequate just in case it proves the atomic reflection principle,
Reflection principles are generically stronger than the theory upon which they reflect. Assuming PA as background theory, (AtRfn B ) implies Bew B (
Hence, The material adequacy of a theory of 'coherence' truth along these lines thus depends upon two conditions:
(i) The coherence base B must be sound and complete for atomic sentences;
(ii) The atomic reflection principle (AtRfn B ) for the coherence base B must be provable in the truth theory.
To satisfy these constraints, for example, the background theory can be chosen to be PA, and the coherence base chosen as some subsystem of PA whose soundness and completeness for atomic sentences can be proved in PA. If we select the base to be Q, these requirements are met, since the atomic reflection principle for Q, stating that any atomic sentence is provable in Q if and only if true, is provable in PA,
This verifies the following corollary of Theorem 6:
Corollary 9: PA(Coh Q ) is materially adequate.
Theorem 6 indicates that we must be able to prove the standard Tarskian truth condition for atomic sentences (in our truth theory) in order to derive the T-sentences.
This then suggests that Wright's approach to 'coherence' truth really is just getting the epistemic notion of provability and the semantic concept of truth back-to-front.
For truth is a semantical concept, not an epistemic or proof-theoretic one. The reason why an atomic sentence of the form t = u is true is intrinsically semantical: the semantic value of t is identical to the semantic value of u. A sentence is not true because it is provable in some axiom system, unless of course this axiom system is already sound, and soundness is intrinsically semantical. There is no eliminating this irreducible semantical aspect.
Of course, the correct truth value of any atomic arithmetic sentence is always computable, and there exist weak axiom systems, such as Q, which prove all these truths and no falsehoods. It seems to me that this convergence of semantic truth value and epistemic computability of truth value for atomic sentences can be philosophically misleading, since the 'symmetry' of semantics and epistemology for basic arithmetic facts is 'broken' even at very low levels of logical complexity of assertions about the natural numbers. For example, at the level of Π 1 -sentences. The reason is that the set of true Π 1 -sentences is not recursively enumerable, and hence not recursively axiomatizable.
Wright continues:
Dialectically, the status of a positive answer is somewhat akin to that of Church's Thesis, that all effectively calculable arithmetic functions are general recursive. A formal proof of Church's Thesis would demand some independent formal characterization of the effectively calculable functionsthe very thing that Church's Thesis purports to provide. Likewise a proof of (EC) would demand some independent characterization of the firstorder arithmetic truths. (Wright 1999, p. 235) .
We have seen above how material adequacy, Wright's (EC), is proved. So I am unsure how to evaluate this claim. Theorem 5 establishes that the set of sentences 'cohering' with a base theory B is precisely the same as the set of arithmetic truths if B is in fact (although we might not be able to prove it) a consistent extension of Q.
Theorem 6 establishes that if the base theory B is not too weird and not too strong one that proves all the disquotational T-sentences) does constrain the extension of the truth predicate rather tightly, modulo a certain subtlety concerning syntactic ω-incompleteness. Consider a truth theory Γ for the base language L containing two materially adequate truth predicates, called T and T*, say. Then it is clear that we
and material adequacy alone does not necessarily guarantee that the universal generalization expressing co-extensionality of T and T* is provable. That is, material
The underlying reason is that there may be non-standard models for the syntactical component of the semantical theory Γ. In a non-standard model M ¸ Γ, the set ... it is important to notice that the conditions for the material adequacy of the definition determine uniquely the extension of the term "true". Therefore, every definition of truth which is materially adequate would necessarily be equivalent to that actually constructed. The semantic conception of truth gives
